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INTRODUCTION 
The world, certainly Europe, would look very different if in No-
vember 1938 the Führer and Reich Chancellor of Nazi Germany had 
been killed. Perhaps people would have regarded him as a "Great 
German," as a noted colleague has speculated; more important, the 
suffering, destruction and division resulting from the Second World 
War might have been avoided. It is well known that attempts to as-
sassinate Hitler were made repeatedly, though it is probably less well 
known how many such attacks there were. At last count, no fewer 
than fourteen individuals made at least thirty separate, documented 
attempts to murder Hitler during the years 1933 to 1945. In the light 
of so much anti-Hitler energy, it seems reasonable and interesting to 
look at the circumstances in which Hitler survived all this hostility for 
so long. The author's interest in those circumstances grew out of a 
study of anti-Hitler activities, of the German Resistance and their 
efforts to do away with the Dictator. It soon became clear that the 
problems of Hitler's personal protection went far beyond those with 
which modern leaders ordinarily have to live, and that they had far 
greater implications, for they affected the lives of literally millions of 
people. 
The obvious question was how Hitler survived the many attempts 
on his life. There were conflicting claims as to how easy or difficult 
it was for a would-be assassin to get close enough to Hitler for a chance 
to kill him. Former members of Hitler's staff maintain it was very 
easy, while survivors of the Resistance say the opposite. A closer look 
at Hitler's personal security will reveal an unprecedented level of 
precautions, and yet, at the same time, the very large number of 
attempts on the Führer's life. It will also shed some light on Hitler's 
character, and on the internal situation in Nazi Germany. 
SURVEY OF ATTACKS 
Most of the early attempts were made by individuals who took it 
upon themselves to defend a category of people which the Nazi regime 
considered enemies: Jews, Communists, political opponents in gen-
eral. More often than not, a group of conspirators planned the attacks, 
but none of the plans originated in ordinary political or other non-
clandestine organizations that had existed before Hitler's appointment 
as Chancellor in January 1933. The Communist and Socialist parties 
consistently rejected assassinations as acts of anarchism; they believed 
in mass action and agitation for bringing about political change. No 
plans are known to have originated in non-clandestine Jewish orga-
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nizations or in one of the two main Christian churches. Individuals, 
however, did act, at their own discretion, regardless of affiliation with 
political organizations. A handful of individual Communists in Kön-
igsberg, who do not appear to have had the sanction of the Party, 
were among the first to plan and prepare an assassination attack 
against Hitler (after his appointment as Chancellor) during the Reichs-
tag election campaign in March 1933. They were soon discovered and 
arrested. Other reports of assassination plans against Hitler reached 
the police in every year of Hitler's rule. The assassination of King 
Alexander of Yugoslavia and French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou 
on 9 October 1934 seems to have led to a rash of plans, rumors, and 
reports. In 1936 a Jewish student from Yugoslavia, Felix Frankfurter, 
who was studying medicine in Switzerland, wanted to kill Hitler, found 
no opportunity, and instead killed the Nazi Landesgruppenleiter in 
Switzerland, Wilhelm Gustloff. Another Jewish would-be attacker, the 
student Helmut Hirsch, came from Prague with dark thoughts, and 
with explosives in his suitcase, but was arrested before he could act. 
A Swiss Catholic theology student, Maurice Bavaud, stalked Hitler 
for several days in November 1938, near Hitler's alpine retreat in the 
Berchtesgaden area, and in Munich where he managed to be on one 
of the reviewing stands for the annual parade commemorating the 
1923 Beerhall Putsch. An unforeseen and minor obstacle prevented 
his attack. When Hitler and his party approached, the SA men lined 
up in front of the reviewing stand, raising their arms for the salute, 
and preventing Bavaud from getting a clear view for a shot. In the 
same year, Georg Eiser, a Swabian cabinet maker, and a Communist 
sympathizer, reconnoitred the same scene for his 1939 bomb attack 
in Munich's Burgerbrau beerhall. Conservative opponents of Hitler 
in high places, in the Foreign Office, in the military intelligence serv-
ice, and in the Army High Command, soon joined by the Socialists, 
trade-union leaders and even church leaders, after 1939 also began 
planning to murder Hitler as the only way to halt his disastrous course. 
In the short term, however, the Nazi cause appeared glorious rather 
than disastrous and thus psychological conditions were thought to be 
unfavourable. Support for attempts to do away with Hitler increased 
in 1942, but some serious planning can be documented also for 1940 
and 1941. A series of abortive attempts in 1943 and 1944 culminated 
on 20 July 1944. 
THE BODYGUARD 
From the days of his political beginnings, Hitler was usually ac-
companied by one or more friends who were both instant private 
audience and bodyguards. His driver of many years, Emil Maurice 
was bodyguard and friend on a certain level, and went to jail with 
Hitler after the 1923 putsch. Another, Ulrich Graf, stopped half-a-
dozen bullets aimed at Hitler in the putsch by throwing himself before 
his leader. Maurice, Graf, Rudolf Hess and others were heroes of 
many an assembly-hall fight, and on public occasions, Hitler was pro-
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tected by additional bodyguards. Still, it would be a mistake to see 
him as constantly surrounded by strong-arm characters, and shielded 
against any molesters. There were many occasions when he moved 
alone into hostile crowds, at times swinging the riding crop he liked 
to carry, and in one incident he rushed onto the speaker's rostrum 
to attack an antagonistic speaker. As much as he needed protection, 
he provoked dangers and attacks by the way he lived and behaved. 
This contradictory pattern continued throughout his career. 
The bodyguard was more formally organized in February, 1932, 
when power seemed within reach. Eight men were selected from the 
SS, and two or three more, on appropriate occasions, were always 
near Hitler, stationing themselves outside his apartment, restaurant, 
hotel room or wherever he visited, while he was inside. This was 
continued after 30 January 1933, although from then on a criminal-
police detail was assigned to Hitler as to every Chancellor. Hitler at 
first rejected their services while Lammers (State Secretary in the Reich 
Chancellery) and Himmler tried to press them on him. But in the 
course of the first year in power, Hitler gradually accepted these 
bodyguards, so that there were now two groups competing to protect 
the Führer: the SS-Begleitkommando, commanded by Bruno Gesche, 
and consisting of a growing number of husky SS men, including the 
valets and personal-staff SS officers (Ordonnanz); and, the criminal-
police detail, composed mainly of officers from the political-police 
forces of the provinces, and soon unified administratively under Lam-
mers and Himmler as the Reichssicherheitsdient (RSD), commanded by 
Captain Rattenhuber. Usually six of each group, S S-Begleitkommando 
and RSD, accompanied Hitler on every outing, be it to the Reichstag, 
to a railway station, to an opera house, to a cabaret or nightclub, or 
to a restaurant. All attempts by Hitler's lieutenants, particularly Himm-
ler, to gain control of the security details failed. Consistently, and to 
the very end, Hitler reserved for himself all decisions on appointments 
and dismissals, insisting on personally swearing in all new members 
and intervening even in salary decisions and the like. Personal loyalty 
and obligation were emphasized by elaborate swearing-in ceremonies, 
held always during the night of 8/9 November, in fron of Munich's 
Feldherrnhalle. 
The SS-Begleitkommando of 1932 were trusted fighters for the 
cause. Although new members were not in every case also members 
of the NSDAP (Nazi Party), their membership in the SS, an organi-
zation of the NSDAP, was regarded as sufficient. Most, but not all, 
RSD officers had NSDAP memberships. Up to 1 May 1937, only about 
half of some one hundred RSD officers were members. The total 
number of RSD officers grew from forty-five in 1935 to two hundred 
in 1939, and about four hundred by the end of 1944. Approximately 
the same figures hold true for the SS-Begleitkommando. 
Besides these two groups, a military guard detachment was as-
signed as Hitler's personal escort for travel during the war: the Fiihrer-
Begleit-Bataillon (it grew in time to regimental and brigade strength). 
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Several, less formalized protective groups were in existence as well, 
such as one in the Reich Chancellery and a construction workers' 
security group on Obersalzberg. Security seemed abundant. 
And yet, the S S-Begleitkommando could not even prevent the theft 
of Hitler's Mercedes car in Munich in 1932 while he was in a cafe. 
Two of the SS-Begleitkommando's commanders were drunkards. Gil-
disch was removed from command in 1934, and went on to become 
the murderer of Dr. Klausener during the Röhm massacre. Gesche, 
Gildisch's successor, managed to hang on until January 1945, with 
temporary suspensions for drunkenness, indiscipline, and shooting 
wildly in the Fiihrer's Headquarters. Emil Maurice, the driver and 
bodyguard of the 1920s, turned out, in 1935, to be of Jewish descent. 
However, because of his services in the early years of the struggle, 
Hitler ordered that Maurice must not be harmed and must be allowed 
to remain in the SS, in spite of Himmler's strong objections. He re-
ceived promotions and survived the war. Another dubious leader, in 
1945, of Hitler's personal SS guard was SS-Brigadeführer Mohnke who 
was reported to be a morphinist. Martin Bormann complained vig-
orously to Hitler that the SS guards were too old, and had achieved 
ranks too high to be effective as ordinary bodyguards, but Hitler 
replied he would never let any of them go, never mind effectiveness. 
The RSD and Führer-Begleit-Bataillon were not plagued by individual 
corruption, and it is fair to say that the RSD did a professional job of 
preventive detection and protection. Their efforts were often de-
feated by Hitler himself as he disregarded simple precautions, and 
certainly during his visits to the fronts he was usually in considerable 
danger. His military guard could not prevent his motor column from 
being shot at by snipers in Poland and they were helpless in February 
1943 when, while Hitler was in conference with Field-Marshal von 
Manstein at Saporoshe (Army Group Don), Russian tanks nearly over-
ran the airfield where the Fiihrer's Condor was parked. In March 1943, 
near Smolensk, on a visit to Kluge's Army Group Centre HQ, a plot 
to shoot Hitler failed only because he refused to take a suggested, 
prepared, and specially "guarded" path, where the "guards" were to 
shoot him. 
SECURITY AND TRAVEL 
Ambiguity of security measures is encountered also when one 
looks at means of transportation, and at public appearances. Hitler 
used heavy, armoured Mercedes Benz cars almost exclusively, and 
they bristled with bodyguards with pistols and machine guns, although 
the cars were almost always convertibles with the tops down. In the 
narrow streets of Nürnberg, a bomb or handgrenade might have been 
hurled into the car. During announced public appearances, the routes 
were lined with police, Gestapo, SS, SA and other guard units, houses 
were searched, roofs were manned with observers, parked cars were 
removed, manholes and sandboxes and construction sites were looked 
into, while mailboxes, underpasses, sewage tunnels, telephone booths 
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and public toilets were not forgotten. Still, only the occupation of all 
buildings and structures along Hitler's route could have provided 
good security and there is no evidence that this was ever done. Con-
sequently the British Military Attaché in Berlin, who lived at no. 1 
Sophienstrasse, could propose in 1939 shooting Hitler while he re-
viewed a parade from his customary reviewing stand, opposite the 
Institute of Technology. From the Attache's bathroom window, one 
would have had a clear shot but Whitehall turned down the unor-
thodox proposition. 
Spontaneous, unannounced appearances held the advantage that 
secrecy, always stressed but difficult to enforce, could be maintained. 
On the other hand, problems with certain factors became worse. Hasty 
and spotty security checks, or no checks at all, were done and there 
was always the chance of a concentration of persons with reasons for 
an attack. In August 1944, Hitler visited Carlshof Field Hospital near 
"Wolfschanze," where some of those injured in the 20 July bomb 
attack were dying or recovering. As he drove in and out in his open 
convertible, several dozen war-wounded, some horribly maimed, 
crowded against the automobile. Hitler could not avoid contact with 
military men, and still conduct the war, but this visit exposed him to 
danger unnecessarily, as if to dare someone to try to kill him. 
There were gaps and contradictions in regulations governing rail 
travel. Elaborate advance security was always necessary when Hitler 
used his special train. It had to be fitted into the schedule, stations 
had to be cleared, and barriers had to be lowered at road crossings. 
Thousands of railway employees had to be informed of the impending 
passage of the special train, all railway installations had to be guarded 
closely and, depending on the distance to be travelled, thousands of 
railway police were deployed. During the war, elements of the Fiihrer-
Begleit-Bataillon were added to the police contingent. Points of par-
ticular sensitivity such as bridges and tunnels were generally occupied 
an hour before passage of the train. All this necessarily destroyed 
secrecy, an indispensable element of all security. To preserve the train 
and its passenger against these odds, the special or duplicate was sent 
down the line on ghost runs at irregular intervals, requiring all the 
railroad men and railway police to be at their posts, never knowing 
whether they protected a train carrying Hitler or his entourage, or 
an empty facsimile. To aid safety and security, a locomotive carrying 
the respective regional chiefs of railway operations always preceded 
the Führersonderzug by ten minutes. The train itself included an ar-
moured car with anti-aircraft batteries at the front and rear, although 
it is not known whether or not Hitler's pullman was armoured; it was 
blown up by German pioneers in May 1945. When the trains had to 
stop en route (to maintain safe distances to other trains, for example) 
or when Hitler was recognized while looking out of his window, the 
public often gathered at stations down the line, after someone tele-
phoned ahead. Such crowds, gathering spontaneously, were impos-
sible to control without considerable advance warning; all stations 
would have had to be sealed off, or security cordons set up in them— 
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an almost impossible undertaking over hundreds of kilometres. Pho-
tographs taken by the court photographers show Hitler reaching down 
from his open window to accept flowers in June 1940. A bomb could 
have been hurled inside, or Hitler might have had his arm twisted 
out of its socket by an enthusiastic well-wisher. 
On the whole, and for long-distance travel, Hitler preferred flying 
to other modes of transportation. Air travel offered better chances 
of maintaining secrecy, for in those days very few people had to be 
informed when a plane was in the air, and there were no crowds, 
crossings, buildings, nor hundreds of kilometres of railway along which 
bombs might be planted. Nevertheless, the ordinary risks of air travel 
were not small. Many times Captain Baur, Hitler's pilot, was not sure 
he would manage to get the plane safely through fog, darkness, muddy 
airfields, loss of radio contact and orientation, engine failure, lack of 
fuel, or other malfunctions. Once a wheel nearly caught fire when 
the brake accidentally jammed, and only an unusually short runway 
prevented a fatal accident. During the war, the danger of enemy attack 
was added, and in fact Baur had a number of close calls though never 
when Hitler was on board. Hitler's seat contained a parachute that 
he could put on by slipping into straps in the back support of the 
seat, and in front of his seat in his Focke Wulf Condor 200 there was 
a steel trap door which could be dropped by pulling a red lever, so 
that Hitler could jump out. Aircraft used by Hitler were guarded day 
and night by special SS and Gestapo details. Before every one of 
Hitler's flights, his plane was taken up to a certain altitude for a ten-
minute test flight to check all functions and to insure that no devices 
set to detonate en route had been planted. The prevailing thinking 
was that such devices would depend on pressure; still, the test flight 
was no safeguard against a time bomb like that of Tresckow and 
Schlabrendorff (13 March 1943). 
SERIOUS ATTEMPTS 
During the war, most assassination plots with reasonable chances 
of success were prepared by people who had or could hope for le-
gitimate access to Hitler's personal presence. Security at Hitler's res-
idences and in announced or planned public appearances was so tight 
that clandestine entry was nearly impossible, except by accident, or 
under the perfect disguise of legitimate business. In 1942, a colonel 
got off the train a stop too soon and found himself inside "Wolf-
schanze," without being challenged at all; in 1943, a Polish woman 
wandered all the way from the east-end to the west-end of "Wolf-
schanze," and she was stopped only at the west gate. Checkpoints, 
passes and guards of course could not stop an assassin who was a 
legitimate "insider" unless and until he uncovered himself. The in-
sider's advantages are obvious; he could stalk his victim inconspi-
cuously. There was one attempt by an outsider, however, in the very 
first months of the war, that came within a hair's breadth of success. 
While Stauffenberg offers the best example for an insider's oppor-
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tunities, Georg Eiser, the Swabian cabinet maker, illustrated the ad-
vantages and disadvantages encountered by the outsider. 
Elser was successful in defeating security, firstly, because it was 
lax. It was generally less perfect than it became after his attack, and 
it had always been particularly poor at the site he chose. The Bürger-
bräukeller was not guarded and secured according to the comprehen-
sive methods developed in the 1930s for other places of public 
appearances, such as the building where the Reichstag met, or the 
Berlin Sportpalast. Unlike these and other places, the Bürgerbräukeller 
was not guarded and searched in advance by agents assigned to Hit-
ler's personal-security forces. It was not guarded at all until only hours 
before an expected appearance by Hitler, and even then it was not 
thoroughly searched. When the question had been raised in the 1930s, 
Hitler had declared he needed no special security precautions when 
he was in the midst of his old fellow fighters to commemorate the 
1923 putsch. Local Party roughnecks, veterans of the early battles and 
of the Röhm massacre, particularly Christian Weber, were in charge 
of security in Munich, and their performance in security matters was 
most unprofessional. Rattenhuber did not have control of security at 
the Bürgerbräukeller until the minute Hitler arrived. Elser was thus 
able to spend as many as thirty-five nights in August, September and 
October 1939, hidden on the balcony inside the large beerhall, work-
ing away at a cavity in the pillar in front of which Hitler always stood 
for his speech. Night after night, he ate supper in the restaurant 
downstairs, wandered upstairs and disappeared until closing time. 
Then he worked, dozed off for an hour or two, and left by the back-
yard exit, carrying a small suitcase with the debris from inside the 
pillar. His appearance—he was short, grey, insignificant—helped him. 
A few days before the event, Elser installed his bomb and two clocks 
set to detonate about an hour into Hitler's speech which usually lasted 
over two hours. Elser got this far because security was almost non-
existent until hours before the event, and because he worked alone 
and a one-man conspiracy could hardly be infiltrated. Elser's isolation, 
a factor in his near-success, was also an important reason for his failure 
for he could not have known that Hitler wanted to be back in Berlin 
by the next morning, that the pilot could not guarantee a flight because 
the heavy fog common at this time of year could not be expected to 
lift much before noon, and that Hitler had therefore decided to take 
his special train. The train was scheduled to leave Munich at 21.31 
and Hitler had to leave the Bürgerbräu about fifteen minutes earlier. 
He did leave the hall at 21.07, and Elser's bomb went off at 21.20, 
killing seven people on the spot. 
After 8 November 1939, security was vastly increased and not 
only at the Bürgerbräukeller. There was a flurry of orders and recri-
minations, and finally, on 9 March 1940, SS-Gruppenführer Heydrick 
as Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD im RSHA issued new, compre-
hensive guidelines. RSD and Gestapo efforts at preventive detection 
were coordinated (with much greater authority going to Rattenhuber). 
The Bürgerbräukeller and all similar sites were put under year-round 
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watch, and for weeks before Hitler's expected appearances, they were 
closely guarded, and searched thoroughly and repeatedly. Hitler con-
tinued to appear in public by surprise, and on such occasions an 
assassin who was prepared and happened to be there could have had 
an excellent chance, but it was a matter of chance. As Hitler spent 
most of his days in his military field headquarters or at his Obersalz-
berg retreat, and since he never followed any set routine (such as 
Heydrich's daily travels to and from his office in Prague in 1942), an 
outsider had no chance of preparing an assassination attack method-
ically. On the other hand, there was no protection against an attack 
by one of the many high-ranking military officers whom Hitler saw 
almost every day of the war, unless the wider nets thrown out by the 
Gestapo and SD hauled him in, penetrating his conspiratorial circle 
before he was allowed into Hitler's presence. 
Claus Graf Stauffenberg, a Colonel in July 1944 and Chief of 
Staff to Generaloberst Fromm, the Commander-in-Chief of the Home 
Army, was a leader of the military and civilian conspiracy against 
Hitler, and in his official capacity he had access to Hitler, seeing Hitler 
face to face for the first time in his life in June 1944. Stauffenberg 
carried a briefcase full of explosives into Hitler's presence on no less 
than three occasions: 11 July, 15 July, and 20 July 1944. On 6 July 
1944 he also had the explosives with him, in Hitler's "Berghof ' Head-
quarters, near Berchtesgaden; at that time he was perhaps still hoping 
that Generalmajor Stieff, Head of the General Staff Organization Sec-
tion in OKH and a co-conspirator with access, might carry out the 
attempt. (Much was to be said for someone other than Stauffenberg 
making the attack: Stauffenberg was an invalid, one-eyed and with 
only one hand with three fingers. Moreover, for a reasonably swift 
and smooth coup d'état, his presence in Berlin at the moment of attack 
would have been important, as later events showed.) On 11 July at 
the "Berghof," Stauffenberg did not set off his bomb because Goring 
and Himmler were not at the conference with Hitler and the senior 
conspirators had insisted that these two must be killed at the same 
time as Hitler. On 15 July, Stauffenberg again attended conferences 
with Hitler, this time at "Wolfschanze" where the Headquarters had 
been moved on 14 July, and again the absence of Goring and Himmler 
was the obstacle. (Much could be said on this point, but in this context, 
only the security aspect can be considered.) On 20 July, Stauffenberg 
carried his briefcase full of explosives into Hitler's immediate presence 
for the third time, entirely unsuspected. This time he had decided to 
ignite the charge regardless of whether Goring and Himmler were 
present. His material required that he have a few private moments 
with his aide just before going to Hitler's conference. Thus, he had 
to start the ten-minute chemical fuse as he managed, under a pretext, 
to be alone in a room with his aide just before the crucial conference. 
Stauffenberg had brought with him two packages, of two pounds each 
of plastic explosive. Both were fitted with chemical delay fuses, one 
for a ten minutes' delay, the other for a thirty minutes' delay. If one 
exploded, the same flash would cause the second package to explode, 
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and it was assumed this was what Stauffenberg intended for no other 
use for the second package is conceivable. While he was pressing the 
acid capsule of the ten minutes' fuse in the one package, an orderly 
came into the room and said Stauffenberg was to hurry up, the con-
ference had begun. In this moment, Stauffenberg must have thought 
himself discovered, as the orderly remained standing at the door, 
looking in. No one knows what went through Stauffenberg's mind; 
but he did leave behind half of the explosive, the second package, he 
had brought with him to Hitler's Headquarters, going off with only 
two pounds of explosive in his briefcase. He had no touble taking this 
to the conference room, and leaving it there, under the great map 
table, while withdrawing on a pretext. The bomb exploded in due 
course, killing four and wounding Hitler lightly. The police experts 
of the commission investigating the circumstances of the attack be-
lieved everyone in the room would have been killed had four pounds 
been detonated instead of two. No planned security measures had 
prevented the success of the attack. In fact, security was so poor at 
this moment that Stauffenberg, against all odds, managed to pass 
through the two inner security cordons after the explosion, although 
in such a situation regulations required that everything be sealed tight. 
He too had the advantage of his appearance: he looked most im-
pressive and inspired awe and respect, and so was able to bluff his 
way out. 
Security was again increased considerably. Identity checks were 
intensified. Fewer persons were allowed into the Führerhauptquartier 
and those who came had to leave all weapons outside. Even a physician 
who came to treat Hitler for ear and throat complaints was forced to 
empty his satchel and pockets and to leave behind a number of med-
icine bottles and other items, and the bulb of his otoscope was screwed 
out and inspected. 
For a while SS guards complemented the Führer-Begleit-Bataillon 
in the inner compound. Some of these new measures were soon re-
laxed, however; after all, the field marshals could hardly be subjected 
to a search of their persons, and members of the inner circle, such 
as Albert Speer, were never searched,and could well have brought 
along plastic explosives, a knife, or even a revolver. X-ray detection 
devices were discussed but not installed. Visitors from the fronts, or 
from headquarters departments, only had to allow guards to examine 
their briefcases, and some visitors stopped carrying them to avoid this 
indignity. The security gaps continued, but searches revealed bizarre 
gaps in some cases. A captain in Ribbentrop's staff had taken literally 
regulations saying that top secret documents must be destroyed when 
in danger of falling into unauthorized hands, and so he always carried 
in his briefcase, along with his papers, a bottle of gasoline and a 
handgrenade. One can well imagine the alarm the discovery caused 
the guards who, after 20 July 1944, examined the captain's briefcase. 
He was informed that he must never again take this kind of precaution 
when coming to the Führerhauptquartier. 
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SUMMARY 
In the end, in the Reich Chancellery bunker in Berlin, Hitler 
directed the final phase of the struggle from this centre of danger, 
refusing to remove himself to safety. In March 1945, he paid a last 
visit to the eastern front, now on the Oder river, and on 20 April he 
received a dozen or so young soldiers who were expected to defend 
Berlin to the last man. While they were dying in the streets of Berlin, 
Hitler took his own life down in the bunker. 
A great deal of personal security can be offered to a head of 
government or head of state, but much depends on his own coop-
eration. Hitler himself believed that he owed his survival through the 
years to accident, luck and Providence more than to the efforts of 
those concerned with his security, yet he permitted and caused the 
constant increase of security precautions. Although he often said there 
was no real protection against a fanatic, and although he always under-
stood how much he depended upon popular support, he outlined to 
Albert Speer the plans for a new Riech Chancellery, to be built as a 
fortress, as protection from "riots" if he was "forced to take unpopular 
measures." The new Chancellery was also to be flanked by SS barracks, 
but, on reflection, Hitler decided to have the Army Guard Battalion 
billetted even closer than the SS Guards. He appeared unsure whom 
to distrust more, the Army or the SS. 
A liberal state in which human life is highest on the scale of values 
cannot provide the same degree of security measures for its leaders 
and prominent persons as a dictatorship and police state. But there 
are startling limits to the security that a police state can offer. In fact, 
Hitler rightly felt endangered, or conversely, protected only by Prov-
idence, which amounted to the same thing. Hitler's dilemma, his in-
decision whether to rely more on the SS or on the Army for his 
personal security, and the constant, but useless, intensifications of 
security point up the most profound gap and contradiction of all, the 
one of which Hitler was very conscious: he was a destroyer of men, 
and the number of his enemies and potential assassins could only 
grow and grow, the more he killed. The quest for greater security 
also reached limits beyond which security diminished, as when security 
was required as protection against potential dangers originating from 
the security forces themselves, and, as when the ruler became so 
isolated from his people that he lost—in the case of demagogues and 
tribunes like Hitler—the very basis of his power to rule. 
Editorial Note 
*This paper is a condensation of material presented by the author in two book-
length works, and was originally presented as a paper for the Canadian Committee 
for the History of the Second World War. For references and further explanation 
please consult the author's The History of the German Resistance 1933-1945 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press; London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1977), esp. parts VI-VII; 
and, Hitler's Personal Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press; London: Mac-
millan Press, 1978), originally published as Die Sicherheil des Diktators (Munich, Zurich: 
Piper & Co., 1975). 
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